O'BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

This is another of those cases, now becoming legion,1 where we must decide if a prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Gerald Sandoval pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, he admitted to several previous felony convictions, two of which, he also admits, are violent felonies as defined by the ACCA. But he claims neither of the two remaining previous felonies considered by the court, first-degree criminal trespass and second-degree assault, are violent. Because either conviction could serve as the third "violent felony" triggering a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA, we address only one and conclude his conviction of second degree assault, even though mitigated by heat of passion, is a violent crime for the purposes of the ACCA.2

DISCUSSION

It is a federal crime for a convicted felon to unlawfully possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Ordinarily, the maximum sentence for that crime is 10 years of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). "If, however, when the unlawful possession occurred, the felon had three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, the punishment is increased to a minimum term of 15 years." Sykes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2270, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). Sandoval claims his conviction for second-degree, heat-of-passion assault (a violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-203(2)), is not a violent felony.

The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as:

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).

Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" is a legal question we review de novo. United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 3021, 180 L.Ed.2d 850 (2011).3 To determine whether a prior conviction is a crime of violence, we must take "a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).4

In Colorado, second-degree assault may be committed in several different ways. Sandoval pled guilty to violating § 18-3-203(1)(b), which provides: "A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if ... [w]ith intent to cause bodily injury to another person, he or she causes such injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon...." The statute, however, contains a mitigating provision, § 18-3-203(2)(a) (1996), which applied in Sandoval's case. At the time of the plea the provision stated:

The district judge decided Sandoval's second-degree assault conviction, even if committed upon provocation and in the heat-of-passion, was a violent crime under the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) ("or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another").6 He is correct.

When evaluating whether a specific statute is a crime of violence under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)'s residual clause, we do not inquire "`into the specific conduct of this particular offender.'" Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2272 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007)). "[Sandoval] freely admits that heat-of-passion assault does not just pose a serious risk of injury to another, it actually requires an injury to another, and with a deadly weapon...." (Appellant's Reply Br. at 7-8.) He argues, however, because a heat-of-passion violation involves, by definition, a lack of deliberation and, in addition, the defendant's acts must result from provocation by the victim "sufficient[] to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person," his offense does not reflect the purposeful and aggressive conduct contemplated by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008).

In Begay, the Supreme Court decided a state conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) was not a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The Court "assume[d] the lower courts were right in concluding that DUI involves conduct that `presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.'" 553 U.S. at 141, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Nonetheless, it concluded DUI was not a "violent felony" because the examples in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) "illustrate the kinds of crimes that fall within the statute's scope," and "[t]heir presence indicates that the statute covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime that `presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.'" Id. at 142, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Thus, to constitute a "violent felony" under the ACCA's residual clause, Begay requires the offense to be "roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [statutory] examples themselves." Id. at 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581. The Court reasoned: "DUI differs from the example crimes — burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives — in at least one pertinent, and important, respect. The listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." Id. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (quotation marks omitted). Because the DUI statute did not require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct to sustain a conviction, it was not a violent crime under the statute.

Following Begay, our residual clause analysis involved a two-part inquiry: (1) "whether the offense presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" and (2) whether "the offense is roughly similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed, to the enumerated crimes," i.e., whether it was purposeful, violent, and aggressive. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 826-27 (quotation marks omitted). It is the second question Sandoval contends we must answer in the negative. He argues his crime is not similar in kind to the enumerated crimes because those offenses require deliberation and cannot be mitigated by heat of passion. According to Sandoval, his crime involved no deliberation, thus making it akin to a crime committed recklessly, not intentionally or purposefully. And under our cases following Begay, "reckless" conduct is not considered a "crime of violence" even if there is a serious risk of physical injury. See, e.g., United States v. Armijo, 651 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir.2011).

His argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court's decision in Sykes limited the application of Begay's inquiry into whether the crime is "purposeful, violent, and aggressive." 131 S.Ct. at 2275. The Court stated:

Id. at 2275-76.

After Sykes, it is not necessary to reach Begay's "purposeful" inquiry when the mens rea of the offense requires intentional conduct. United States v. Smith, 652 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2011). "Where the felony at issue is `not a strict liability, negligence or recklessness crime' the test is not whether the crime was `purposeful, violent, and aggressive' but whether it is `similar in risk to the listed crimes.'" Smith, 652 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2276); see United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1141 n. 4 (10th Cir.2011) (Sykes limited Begay's test to strict liability, reckless, and negligent crimes). Here, the statutory elements of second-degree, heat-of-passion assault require specific intent, i.e. Sandoval intended to cause bodily injury to the victim and actually caused bodily injury.7 The intent and risk involved in his crime clearly meet the Sykes test.8

Even if we were to consider the mitigating clause and apply the Begay test, it would make no difference. Heat of passion is not an element of second-degree assault. See People v. Sanchez, 253 P.3d 1260, 1263 (Colo.App.2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 2175853 (Colo. May 16, 2011) ("[T]he statutory elements that the prosecution must prove for first or second degree assault do not include proof of the presence or absence of heat of passion."). Instead, it is "a circumstance that mitigates otherwise applicable penalties for [certain] crimes...." People v. Villarreal, 131 P.3d 1119, 1126 (Colo.App.2005). Even though Sandoval's crime may have been impulsive, it is no less violent and intentional. Although Sandoval may have acted without deliberation and subject to an "irresistible passion," his conduct still constituted a violent, purposeful, and aggressive felony. See People v. Martinez, 32 P.3d 582, 584 (Colo.App.2001) (Colorado second-degree murder conviction is a crime of violence even if committed in the heat of passion); United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 780 (8th Cir.2008) (Colorado assault in the first degree, whether in the heat of passion or not, is still a violent crime under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2)).

AFFIRMED.